Since psychosis occasionally leads to behaviour requiring constraint, psychiatrists are involved in decisions which may lead to loss of liberty. In some places and at some times psychiatrists and their predecessors have made those decisions unrestrained. This essay considers how we have used that power in the past, indicates some of the abuses extant now, recognises that there is no satisfying solution to the problems which exist and argues for the consistency of the legal system with all its limitations rather than the uncertain and unrestrained judgment of individual psychiatrists.
This essay exists because I attended a meeting in which a number of psychiatrists well known to me as honourable and altruistic professionals were offended when equally honourable and altruistic lawyers argued that some activities of psychiatrists constitute a danger to the liberty of the individual, and therefore require careful and continuing review. I found myself in agreement with the lawyers; subsequent conversations have persuaded me that it is worth writing down why this should be so.
It is important not to be diverted by some important but irrelevant considerations. A11 would agree that the wicked and incompetent should be dealt with firmly; here we are concerned with practitioners who pass muster. Similarly we must not be deflected into discussing the barbarities which once were inflicted in the name of treatment. Those who bled, purged, vomited, whirled and immersed their patients in cold water held the mistaken belief that benefit would arise from these things. For the same reason teachers were flogging children, aboriginal families were being fragmented The Northside Clinic, 2 Greenwich Road, Greenwich NSW 2065 John Ellard AM, FRACP, FRC Psych, FRANZCP, M A P 8 and the State was hanging its citizensin the last case for the benefit of others. The world has changed: we are a little less brutal than were our grandfathers and we know some things that they did not know. Again, while there have been undoubted abuses of psychiatry in such places as the USSR and South Africa my interest here is in states which proclaim their internal freedom, such as ours. Another category of psychiatric coercion must be specified and excluded. Assume that I have the charge of an institution containing demented patients who are given to wandering. It is surrounded by busy highways and deep rivers. In New South Wales, if I lock my patients within the institution I am breaking the law; if I let them wander at large doubtless some of them will be maimed or killed, which is absolutely unacceptable. There is adefect in the relevant legislation which has existed for 200 years. Until very recently no one has been much concerned to right it: the wonder is that we have not been sued both for acting and for failing to act.
Having stated my exclusions, the question remains: were my colleagues justified in feeling offended? Are those who criticise us now fighting a battle that ended half a century ago? Is our altruism a sufficient guaran-tee for the future? One of the best ways of predicting dangerousness is to examine the past records of persons in question [ 11; it seems reasonable to apply this technique to the practice of psychiatry. Every profession has traditions ,which guide its activities, sometimes without being recognised by those subject to them.
Psychiatfy and institutions
There have been individuals practising psychiatry for at least four centuries. For example, in 1600 the Archbishop of Canterbury, guided by the testimony of appropriate experts, licensed John Freeman to practise the art of medicine amongst the mad and melancholy in the Province of Canterbury, provided that he gave certain spiritual and temporal undertakings no longer required by most licensing bodies (21. However, the organised profession of psychiatry arose 200 years later from an assemblage of asylum superintendents who were in turn the descendants of the madhouse keepers of the 17th and 18th centuries. The madhouses, and the asylums which laterjoined them, were part of the general policy of dealing with social misfits by putting them in places of confinement variously called workhouses, bridewells, penitentiaries, asylums and houses of correction. It was a policy embarked upon with some enthusiasm. For example, within months of its creation, the HBpital Gtntral in Paris contained several thousand inmates, more than one in a hundred of the citizens of that city. Its charter placed it completely outside the law, the King being its patron and guardian. It was thought to be a great success, for by the time of the Revolution there were 31 more [3] .
At first all the socially disadvantaged were lumped together in such institutionsthe beggars, the dispossessed, the sick, the criminal and the lunatic. As time passed their numbers grew and attempts were made to sort this unhappy mixture of people into its components, so that they could be incarcerated separately. The modem prison system is still the repository of individuals from all these categories and still busy classifying them. The madhouses were part of the total array of institutions, and should have limited their efforts to containing the insane. Ominously they did not, and their practices became infamous. Daniel Defoe, who in 1697 had railed at the unjust treatment of natural fools, 30 years later turned his attention to the abuses of psychiatric process occurring in the madhouses. What he wrote needs no elaboration [4] . "This leads me to exclaim against the vile Practice now so much in vogue among the better Sort, as they are called, but the worst sort in fact, namely the sending their Wives to Mad-Houses at every Whim or Dislike, that they may be more secure and undisturb'd in their Debaucheries: Which wicked Custom is got to such a Head, that the number of private Mad-Houses in and about London, are considerably increased within these few Years. This is the height of Barbarity and Injustice in a Christian Country, it is a clandestine Inquisition, nay worse. How many Ladies and Gentlewomen are hurried away to these Houses, which ought to be suppress'd or at least subject to daily Examination, as hereafter shall be proposed? ... For the cure of those who are really Lunatick, licens'd Mad-Houses should be constituted in convenient Parts of the Town, which Houses should be subject to proper Visitation and Inspection, nor should any Person be sent to a Mad-House without due Reason, Inquiry and Authority."
Twelve years later an anonymous pamphleteer took up the same cause, with equal vigour IS]. "Another Grievance, and 1 think a great one, is, that several are put into Mad-houses, as they are called, without being mad, Wives put their Husbands in them that they may enjoy their Gallants, and live without the Observation and Interruption of their Husbands; and Husband put their Wives in them, that they may enjoy their Whores, without Disturbance from their Wives; Children put their Parents in them, that they may enjoy their Estates before their time; Relations put their Kindred in them for wicked Purposes, Guardians to cheat their Pupils, Managers those with whom they are entrusted either by Law or Choice, Instances of each which I have known in my own time, and all this without Redress; I know of a Gentlewoman of substance who lived at Windsor, who was flattered by her roguish Apothecary into the Management of her Fortune, and when he had fixed himself in her Opinion and did all her Business for her, he decoyed her into a Mad-house not far from London on the Bank of the River Thames, where he took care that she was so ill used, that she, after a while, was made really mad in good earnest, and the Apothecary enjoy'd her Fortune, and took care that no Relation or Acquaintance of hers should have access to her. or visit her."
Passing the buck
Although the abuses were notorious no one was in a hurry to deal with them. Sir Cordell Firebrass suggested that the College of Physicians supervise the private madhouses: the College was flattered but apprehended " ... that the execution of that Trust will be attended with such Difficulties as will make it very inconvenient to perform it" [6] . Perhaps the fact that some of the madhouses were conducted by members of the College contributed to the apprehended inconvenience.
In 1763 Parliament appointed a Committee to enquire into the matter and subsequently leave was granted to bring in a regulatory Bill. Nothing eventuated, and the same unproductive sequence recurred in 1772 and 1773. Finally an "Act for Regulating Madhouses" was passed, entrusting that duty to five Commissioners, appointed annually by the reluctant College. The Commissioners had very limited powers, an equal amount of expertise andbeing appointed annuallyno prospect of acquiring any. Nevertheless the College expressed no discontent, and the pressure for reform continued to come, not from our profession, but from magistrates, philanthropists and evangelicals "71.
Once more speeches were made, committees sat, Bills were drafted and little happened. It was quite clear that the College of Physicians was pleased to maintain the status quo, and make sure that physicians remained in charge, for those of its members who gave evidence in front of the House of Lords Select Committee of I828 all agreed that surgeons should be kept out of the industry. They also proposed inspections and did not accept that patients should be visited daily [8] .
The struggle for independent monitoring of what had become asylums continued for many years until 1845, when the Lunacy Commission was established [9] . The Commission comprised three doctors and three lawyers and was given power sufficient to regulate the activities of the asylums and entrance to them.
During the second half of the 19th century it became evident that the earlier enthusiasms about the moral treatment of the insane had little basis, and that most who entered the asylums were to stay there and become habituated to their own alien worlds. The numbers contained in the institutions increased, rising from 7,140 in 1850 (4.03/10,000) to 74,004 in 1900 (23.05/10,000) -an increase of more than fivefold, allowing for the larger population. At its maximum in 1954 thenumberreached 148,000(33.45/10,000). The conditions in which they were held deteriorated pari passu [ 101. Nevertheless, the Lunacy Act of 1890, which came into operation in England and Wales on May 1st of that year consolidated many of the safeguards which had been sought. Thus Section 9 [ 1 11 stated, "No person can be placed under care and treatment or be received and detained in an institution for lunatics, except upon 'judicial authority' or when found lunatic by inquisition. The powers of this judicial authority shall only be exercised by a justice of the peace specially appointed, or a judge of County Courts, or a magistrate.".
Even so the protection was imperfect, for the Superintendent or medical attendant could sign Form 5, which stated [ 121, "I certify that it would be prejudicial to A.B. to be taken before or visited by a justice, a judge of county courts, or a magistrate". It should be noted that he was not required to certify why such a visitation would be harmful.
The Act of 1890 cast a long shadow in Australia, for the New South Wales Lunacy Act of 1898 was closely based upon it, and the Mental Health Act of 1958 (part of which still obtains) not much more than a modest revision of it. The passage of the 1890 Act took most of the fire out of a debate which by then had been raging for more than 200 years. The part played by our profession in that controversy does not increase one's confidence in its desire or its capacity to regulate itself.
The social context
Recalling the events of the 18th and 19th centuries might make it seem that the psychiatrists and physicians were more authoritarian than most of their contemporaries. A glance at other attitudes and activities in the community during that period soon dispels such a view. When the 19th century began there were more than 220 statutes containing the death penalty within them; judicial interpretation had expanded that list into more than 350 capital offences [ 131. Most of those whose convictions confronted them with being hanged were under age, and some of them were children. Nevertheless until 1836 the accused were not allowed counsel and had to conduct their own defence. The consequences of a failed defence were considerable. In 1808 Michael Hamond and his sister aged 7 and 1 1 respectively were hanged, and in 1831 a boy of 9 was publicly hanged at Chelmsford. To be fair, this may have represented an improvement on the practices of the days of George 11, when 10 children under the age of 10 were hanged all in a row. The last person burned alive was Christian Murphy, who suffered this fate in 1789, for coining Not until the passage of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 were those accused permitted to take the witness stand and give evidence on their own behalf. It became law against the wishes of many of the judges, the Lord Chief Justice describing it as a "great public mischief'. Similarly the judiciary managed to block the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal for some 70 years: before it was constituted a convicted person had nothing to hope for but the Royal Pardon. Some of the judges' arguments against it were that it would "worry prosecutors", that it would not be a "natural thing" and that it would "undermine altogether the responsibilities ofjuries" [ 151.
If it is necessary for us to hang our heads in shame we should not lack company.
During the first half of this century the asylums continued to grow in size and number, the cost of their maintenance increasing correspondingly. Few votes being found there, all governments neglected them greatly. Most of the Royal Commissions and Committees of Inquiry endemic in this area arose from scandals consequent upon that neglect, and were concerned with attempts to procure minimal standards of care and accommodation for the poor wretches incarcerated in them rather than with seemingly abstract matters such as the preservation of civil liberties. The great number of such investigations is testimony to their general lack of success. Two major wars also diverted everyone's attention to more pressing matters. The atmosphere began to change in the late 1960's; for example, the United States Supreme Court began to turn its attention to civil liberties then and in the 70's. Both the asylums and the prisons found themselves under attack, albeit for slightly different reasons. It is significant that two wide-ranging reports on the condition of psychiatry here and overseasthose of Alan Stoller L 161 and David Maddison [ I71 -published in the mid 50's did not examine the issue of commitment. This is no criticism of the authors, nor of those who laid down their terms of reference: it was not the concern of the time.
It was not that the issue was dead, nor that abuses did not occur. In this country the case of William Chidley showed very clearly what can happen. Chidley was a citizen of Sydney whose unorthodox beliefs about diet, dress and techniques of sexual intercourse outraged the conservatives of that city in the early 1920's. Those unfamiliar with his story should read ~4 1 .
Edward's and Hall's engrossing account of his activities 1181; a brief and inadequate summary must serve here. He was probably deluded; he was certainly harmless. Nevertheless he found himself in an asylum: on appeal he was found to be insane but released on two 250 sureties provided that he did not offend against public decency, that is, he did not upset those presumed to be his betters. He did, and was soon back in the asylum, where he died. It is noteworthy that both certifying doctors believed that he should be deprived of his liberty not because he was physically dangerous, but because he was "a danger to public morals". The judge was prepared to release him, provided that he was gagged. Nowadays his views would pass unnoticed, or turn up in one of the more imaginative magazines. Psychiatric process was used to silence a man whose views disturbed those in power. Much later, during the Vietnam war, I recall a senior American politician suggesting that selected anti-war demonstrators should have electrodes permanently implanted in their brains so that the cerebral disorder necessarily underlying such beliefs could be located and corrected.
More recently Stalstrom [ 191 has reported the difficulties encountered by a man who contacted the police to report that his employer and others were involved in blackmarketing and tax evasion. His employer informed the superintendent of the local psychiatric hospital, who diagnosed the complainant as suffering from paranoia and locked him up. After he had emerged from hospital and been put back in twice more the psychiatrist took his tax books to the taxation department to prove the man's insanity. The subsequent investigations uncovered the largest tax scandal ever to take place in Finland, involving many eminent personages.
Legal representation
These examples make it clear that Utopia had not been achieved: more could be given, and it is clear that some continuing concern is not out of place. Its substantial manifestation in New South Wales was the formation of the "Legal Representation Committee" in December 1976; its task may be inferred from its name. In New South Wales all patients proposed fro compulsory hospitalisation on the grounds of mental illness must appear before a magistrate within a day or two of their admission to hospital. The magistrate conducts a hearing which may be attended by all the interested parties, and then determines the patient's disposal. The enquiry showed that if patients were represented (whether by a lawyer of some other person) there was a demonstrable effect upon the proceedings and their outcome. Before representation only 5% of the hearings were graced by the presence of the doctor whose opinion it was that the patient should be detained: this gave little opportunity for testing its validity. When the patient was represented doctors attended 48% of the hearings. More relatives turned up, more decisions were deferred, and more patients were discharged by the magistrate. In short, patient representation tightened things up [20] .
There were some problems. Not all the medical practitioners relished being asked to justify their opinions, and some wanted legal representation for themselves. Their requests showed that they were under a misapprehension, for they did not see themselves as witnesses (a truthful and disinterested witness does not require legal representation) but rather as having another role, not easily defined.
There were anecdotes which suggested that on occasion patients who might have benefited greatly from treatment did not receive it. This leads to the question of balancing one risk against another, which we shall defer for the moment.
The Committee did not report on one particular observation which in any case was not within its terms of reference. For several months the hospital was visited by lawyers, social workers and others, some deeply sceptical about any form of psychiatric treatment or detention. No one discovered a patient improperly detained because of an abuse of psychiatric process. I was one of the Committee and took care to raise the question now and then. We were dealing with imperfections of procedure, not misuse of power. There is every reason to observe and correct inefficient procedure, especially when liberty is at stake, but it is important to keep one's perspective.
The patient representation begun then has continued since; all those participating have learned from it. I have no information concerning the benefits and harms which followed its introduction, nor do I know what it has cost. At this point it might be seen that the situation in New South Wales is being sorted out, and that a gentle evolution will bring us to the desired condition, whatever that might be. Nothing could be further from the truth. In a most carefully considered and precisely worded judgement His Honour Mr. Justice Powell of the Supreme Court of New South Wales has set out the statutes and the precedents which determine the law now [21] . In effect, unless a patient manifests delusions, hallucinations or other psychotic symptoms then he or she is not a mentally ill person for the purposes of the relevant Mental Health Act. Thus a grossly demented patient without those symptoms cannot be detained, and must be released. This places everyone, including the patient, in an impossible position, but the legislature has been in no hurry to repair it, for Mr. Justice Powell handed down his judgement in November 1986.
There are other problems about the legalisation of commitment. The strict duty of the patient's lawyer is to take instructions from his client and to do his best to achieve what he demands. It is not the legal representative's duty to make a judgement about whether or not those demands are in his client's best interests; if such a decision is to be made at all it is to be made by the magistrate, and in any case he must find as the law determines. If a deeply depressed patient instructs his lawyer that he should be tortured and then executed to expiate his crimes, or that he is so wicked that he should never be releasedwhat then? Should the lawyer follow his instructions, or does he make a judgement about the patient's best interests, a judgement not always granted to his attending doctor?
The situation now
The central conflict in this context is between paternalism and liberty; it has taken us a long way from my offended colleagues. They may join Henry Ford, and argue that history is bunk. Now that psychiatrists are better informed, that people are more aware of their legal rights and malpractice suits are the order of the day, can it not be argued that legal interference and commitment is more trouble and expense than it is worth? Let us trust the altruism of psychiatrists.
To test that proposition let us discover a vulnerable population, and see what psychiatrists are doing currently when not subject to judicial review. It is not as easy as it used to be to find a disadvantaged group without its champions, but if we look where money is to be made we should have some success. Adolescents and juveniles suggest themselves, for they are often scapegoated, and often engage in unlovable behaviour. When moved to rebellionfor whatever reasonthey are very likely to break the rules of their families, and not unlikely to break the rules of the State. Furthermore, the laws are likely to be biased against them: few of our legislators can see the incongruity in a cigar smoking whisky drinker sentencing someone for using marijuana. Additionally the legal status of adolescents is insecure. In the United States, where our observations will take us, the United States Supreme Court in 1979 in Parham vs JR held that it is lawful for parents to commit their minor children to mental hospitals providing that the admitting physician agrees that the need is there [22] . As we have seen, history would suggest that it might not be impossible to discover a compliant physician who would see the need whatever the situation might be.
Consider now the state of the private hospital industry in the United States, in which the occupancy of medical and surgical beds is declining rapidly, with a coincident fall in profits. At the time of writing psychiatry is outside the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) payment system, and therefore relatively unregulated. Since what is commonly called health care can be marketed in the media it is easy to devise programmes directed at such problems as drug abuse, school failure, delinquency and unhappiness at home, and then advertise them to Concerned or exasperated parents. That the literature has little to say about the outcome of such programmes need not be an impediment to their advertisement. Put all these circumstances together and one might anticipate a rising inpatient population of juveniles, detained with such diagnoses as "personality disorder", "adaptation reaction" or "behavioural problem" [ 2 2 ] .
The facts speak for themselves. At a time when for better or worse the emphasis has been on discharging adult patients from large institutions and placing them in small onesthe "community"the number of juveniles in the United States psychiatric hospitals has risen. Between 1966 and 1981 the number of private inpatient facilities for children and adolescents increased from 145 to 369, and between 1980 and 1984 the number of adolescents admitted to private psychiatric hospitals increased 450% -to 48,375 [23] . Remember that these young people can be held in hospital if the attending psychiatrist thinks it necessary; there is no other review. One wonders how much seclusion, medication and behaviour modification is used to produce the desired result. It is not surprising to learn that on average juveniles stay in hospital approximately twice as long as do adults in the same diagnostic groupings [24] . None of this amounts to solid proof of perfidy, but viewed in the context of the brief historical summary which began this essay one is entitled to some misgivings.
In 1987 an International Forum on Mental Health Law Reform was held in Kyoto, Japan [25] . One of its sponsors was the Japanese Society for Psychiatry and Neurology. It was held in Japan because the current state of affairs in that country is not much removed from that which obtained in the days of the private madhouses in 18th century England. Thus under Article 33 of the Japanese Mental Health Act a patient can be detained for 530 days with the consent of his or her nearest relative [26] . There is no judicial hearing to regulate his loss of liberty; one of the reasons the Ministry of Health gave for opposing such an innovation was that psychiatrists might feel criticised and under pressure [27] . How the patients felt did not seem to be the Ministry's concern, for conditions in many of the private hospitals also compare with those of the 18th century 1281.
The conference produced five statements, the Kyoto Principles. The third Principle is that every person has a right to a full and impartial judicial hearing before involuntary loss of liberty. I believe that the evidence shows that this declaration is sound, and that the presence of mental illness does not remove the need for its observance.
The psychiatrist's dilemma
Why then were my colleagues offended? Firstly, I suggest, because they were not familiar with the social history of their craft. Psychiatry, being concerned with the behaviour of men and women, cannot avoid being involved in the regulation of that behaviour. That involves the exercise of power, and power can corrupt a psychiatrist just as it can corrupt anyone else.
Secondly, because they fell into the error of anticipating that others would behave as they themselves would have behaved. Being honourable and altruistic, they assumed that all others would necessarily conduct themselves similarly. This is part of a larger fallacy: all my life I have been encountering innocents who believe that once propositions based on intelligence, logic and fairness are brought to the notice of those in power they will be adopted forthwith, with expressions of gratitude and pleasure. The world is not like that.
The third reason is more subtle, for it revolves around a question which has no unequivocal answer. Good doctors believe that they should do what is in their patients' best interests, and usually the way is clear. Difficulties arise when patient and doctor disagree, and those difficulties are complex when cerebral disease disturbs the patient's reason and equilibrium.
Some cases may help. Consider a gentleman who spends his fortune constructing a machine to make water run uphill. He is harming no one, his money is being distributed around the community, and his days are filled with pleasurable anticipation. He may be as mad as a hatter, but that is no reason to lock him up. Consider another man who has just suffered a major brain injury. He is confused, disorganised and enraged, and attacks anyone who approaches him, believing them to be attacking him. It seems in everyone's interest, including his, to detain him medically until peace is restored, rather than entangle him in the criminal justice system.
Somewhere between these two cases there is a Rubicon to be crossed; it would be remarkable if everyone agreed on the critical point. Consider now the case of an elderly woman who believed that sexual rays were emitted by all fluorescent light tubes, to her detriment, and whose money was being taken by miscreantssome medicalwho promised her a cure and supplied her with remedies which seemed to work for a little while. She was grateful for their efforts and plied them with more money. Bankruptcy loomed and psychiatric help was rejected. It is a real case; wellmeaning doctors put her in an asylum and a judge let her out. What were her best interests?
Conclusion
There is an inescapable conflict between respecting patients' autonomy, and ensuring that when their judgement is clouded by disease neither they nor those about them are thereby exposed to danger. In most cases the proper course of action will be obvious enough, but the complexity of life ensures that there will be others in which contention will arise. Beyond this honourable dilemma there is the prospect that patients may be exploited, and their needs and rights disregarded.
The problem is that psychiatrists tend to see the issue as it is exemplified by the particular patient in front of them, without recognising that if they are given the untrammeled power to control that instance, then equally other psychiatrists will be given the power to control other instances, with results that we have seen. Lawyers have a better sense of precedent, and see the dangers more clearly. The judicial process is not divinely inspired, and therefore can fall into error, but if it is conducted openly, by rules which are public, if it is subject to appeal, then least harm should be done,
The choice is between trusting the idiosyncrasies of individuals who may well have their own defects, or the consistency of a system with its probable inflexibility. History makes the system the safer choice.
